Drawn on December 5, 2024 | Published from Miami
You can almost hear it, off in the distance – winds carrying a guttural song undulating in a minor key.
Allahu Akbar
Ashhadu an la ilaha illa Allah
Ashadu anna Muhammadan Rasool Allah...
A powerful Arabic testimonial billowing, echoing; scattering. Perhaps, if not consumed by the drama, you may be able to pick up on the Turkish accent: An imam bearing witness that there is no god worthy of worship but the One God – Allah – framed by a verse upholding Muhammad as his messenger. Talk about a below-the-belt ego blow on a technicality — poor Jibrīl, the archangel who delivered the divine message, barely gets a mention. Then again, the wire operator who connected Nixon to the Apollo 11 LEM didn’t exactly make the history books either.
"Wind has no smell... It brings it, on occasion." [1]
— Philippe Geluck, Le Chat est content, 2000.
The way the Anatolian peninsula reaches out toward Europe, in the same way God’s finger hovers near Adam's on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, serves as a somber reminder of how similar — yet numinously distant — the two forbidden continents truly are. Sure, you can hear the Adhan ripple across the Bosphorus; Istanbul straddles both banks, and the only audio barrier is the occasional foghorn of ships crossing from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. Yet the cultural divide between Europe and Asia, today more than ever, feels almost insurmountable.
Turkey is a century-old nation that chose the path of secular democracy following the crushing defeat of its former empire. Despite its uncertain beginnings and the questionably prolonged tenure of its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the framework he sought to formalize for the fledgling state was a commendable attempt at establishing democracy in the Muslim world. The era of the antagonistic Central Powers had ended — the final vestiges of imperial ambition buried in the trenches at Verdun and laid to rest in a train car at Versailles. The Turks were on their own.
It seemed to work for a time. With pioneering reforms even surpassing those of the ex-Triple Entente, including radical measures like women’s suffrage and compulsory education, the premise of democracy could have been seen as a double-edged sword in a world deeply entrenched in Islam — one that could never truly be sheathed. In a move reminiscent of Protestants translating the Bible out of Latin, Turkey’s new leader sought to temper widespread trepidation: Perhaps recognizing that this theological behemoth was immovable, he deemed it prudent to extend the democratization experiment to religion as well. On January 30, 1932, and for 18 years thereafter, the call to prayer was broadcast sacrilegiously in Turkish, not Arabic, five times a day all through the nation. The goal? To ensure that every pious illiterate listener from Izmir to Mount Ararat could finally grasp the messianic message.
By Ramadan eve in 1950, this daily regimen of rigorous indoctrination had peaked, with the call to prayer reverting to its Arabic form, though echoes of Turkish still resonated across the provinces throughout the remainder of the century. Islam, the unifying force that had held the mighty Ottoman Empire together for 600 years, was stirring once again, critically manifesting in the resurgence of Muslim intellectual movements, such as the revival of religiously focused schools like the madrasas of old [2]. Still, it would take another 70 years before their influential graduates regained control over Turkey’s leadership — eventually ushering in the era of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
So, where does that leave us today? Erdoğan, a man well-versed in the art of ruthless leadership, has mastered the delicate balance of censorship, revisionist history, theology, and cult of personality — elevating himself from president to president-for-life. So far. Both at home and to the world at large, his most effective weapon is his goofy existence as a walking contradiction: a pragmatic fundamentalist.
His profoundly warped brand of Atatürk nationalism continues to hold sway, even as the growing number of imprisoned opponents raises uproar. This appeal, incredibly, registers even with critics, including younger generations who, much like their counterparts in America, puzzlingly embrace the shiny qualities of strong-arm authoritarians despite their dismal human rights records. Economically, the nation always seems to teeter on the brink of collapse [3], but its unwavering religious devotion, one fundamentalist enough to have demoted the Hagia Sophia from a museum back to a mosque [4], provides a heavy counterweight of culturally Islamic solidarity above all. This depth of faith is further reflected in Turkey having the largest Muslim army in the world [5], projecting a robust Sunni allegiance and an incidentally problematic combination, requiring very little to tip the scale toward a full caliphate. Under this president's rule, the military has become an instrument of personal power, its loyalty cemented after the failed 2016 coup [6]. This precarious balance of fiscal desperation and ideological zeal fuels Turkish assertiveness on the world stage.
Abroad, Turkey stands as a true dichotomy. It is a NATO member from Asia Minor, with former aspirations of joining the E.U., yet it frequently challenges the unity of its allies with antagonistic goals:
Ownership of Cyprus remains a flashpoint, with Greece firmly resisting Turkish protests, frequently clashing over maritime boundaries and airspace violations in the Aegean. Meanwhile, Turkey’s involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina signals a thirst to rekindle Ottoman influence in the Balkans. To top it all, Erdoğan's rhetoric does not recognize the existence of certain borders traced by French and British winners of the First World War, particularly in Iraq and Syria, where he explicitly affirms territorial claims. The Treaty of Lausanne, which Erdoğan vexatiously suggests “expired” in 2023 [7], and the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres [8], which sought to abolish the Ottoman Empire, serve as symbolic rallying cries for ambitions to redraw a map unseen since November 11, 1918.
Erdoğan's approach to Syria is as complicated as it gets for his plans, with more factional flags involved than there were during the Holy Roman Empire. In a land already so infamously plagued by warring rebels, Jihadist groups, Cold War proxies, and a freshly toppled dictatorship [9] that gassed its own people, Recep has remained steadfast in his having a slice of the pie. For a start, since August 2016, Turkey has maintained its presence in Northern Syria, a progressively growing occupation [10] pushed chiefly by Erdoğan's determination to eliminate his long-time socio-political enemies — the Kurds. Ethnically distinct from Arabs, this nationless population has arguably been the most ironically screwed group from arbitrary regional land divisions sketched by former European colonists. Spread across multiple previously Ottoman territories in the Middle East, the Kurds serve as a convenient scapegoat for Erdoğan’s policies, with their reputation as well-poisoners used to justify increasingly aggressive military incursions [11].
With U.S. troops largely withdrawn from Syria after the 2019 [12] takedown of the so-called Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and Russia reorienting its military focus from flattening Aleppo to decimating Kyiv, a marshal vacuum has emerged that Turkey is eager to fill. While Erdoğan ostensibly justifies his actions as a means of countering Kurdish terrorism, his deeper motives likely involve reclaiming 16th-Century territory [13] along the Tigris and Euphrates, and seizing 21st-Century resources like the Syria-Iraq-Iran oil pipeline — potentially a Hail Mary to patch up his shredded economy with an OPEC-like [14] bandage.
In spite of the paradoxical ebb and flow of amity and provocation toward Russia [15], Erdoğan's latest peace overtures [16] may have been calculated to gauge the Kremlin’s intentions before exploiting a weakened Russia preoccupied by its war of attrition in Ukraine. If Turkey were to act, especially with the Assad government overthrown in the lightning offensive by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani's Turkish-backed HTS [17] — leaving Bashar now to crash on Putin’s couch [18] — it could intensify regional chaos, challenge NATO’s resolve, and reshape alliances, all while Erdoğan’s empire-building dreams march ever forward.
With Russia fixated on Europe, China eyeing Taiwan, the U.S. building its walls, and Israel expanding its promised land, the world seems preoccupied with re-chopping borders these days. The Empire Lounge is a trendy spot and Turkey is keen to cut in line.
One thing is certain, in this “race to retrace” the landmass once controlled by the Ottomans from Algiers to Bahrain and Mecca to Belgrade, Turkey’s leader might look to the past for lessons from the political revolutions that toppled Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, and most recently, Bashar al-Assad. Can the Turkish leader navigate his domestic landscape with the subtlety required to avoid the same fate as those who came before him, all while advancing his Muhammadian invasion into Syria, Iraq, Iran, and maybe even Saudi Arabia?
Inshallah; or rather ‘inşaAllah,’ I suppose.
[1] Original French; « Le vent n’a pas d’odeur... Il en apporte, éventuellement.»
Geluck, P. (2000) in Le Chat est Content, Tome 10. Casterman.
[2] Like the İmam Hatip school, a religious vocational school founded in 1951, attended by Erdoğan.
[3] Turkey: Imports and exports (2024) TrendEconomy. Available at: https://trendeconomy.com/data/h2/Turkey/93 (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[4] Temple transformations:
Guerin, O. (2020) Hagia Sophia: Turkey turns iconic Istanbul Museum into Mosque, BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53366307 (Accessed: 09 December 2024).
After Hagia Sophia, Turkey turns another museum into Mosque (2021) AP News. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/religion-international-news-middle-east-europe-28abfe52f1ed887c743eeaa39c92d6f3 (Accessed: 09 December 2024).
[5] Bensaid, A. (2018) The 12 strongest militaries in the ‘muslim world’, TRT World - Breaking News, Live Coverage, Opinions and Videos. Available at: https://www.trtworld.com/mea/the-12-strongest-militaries-in-the-muslim-world-21129 (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[6] 2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkey (2016) U.S. Department of State. Available at: https://www.state.gov/reports/2016-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/turkey/ (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[7] Lausanne:
Treaty of Lausanne (2024) Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Lausanne-1923 (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
Baydar, Y. (2020) Erdoğan setting the stage for invalidating the Lausanne Treaty after Hagia Sophia move, ahvalnews.com. Available at: https://ahvalnews.com/2023-centenary/erdogan-setting-stage-invalidating-lausanne-treaty-after-hagia-sophia-move (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[8] Sèvres:
Treaty of Sèvres (2024) Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Sevres (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
Jégo, M. and Kaval, A. (2020) Cent ans après, la Revanche d’Erdogan sur le traité de sèvres, Le Monde.fr. Available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2020/07/31/turquie-revanche-sur-le-traite-de-sevres_6047822_3210.html (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[9] Shaheen, A. and Sewell, A. (2024) Russian state news agencies say ousted Syrian leader Bashar Assad is in Moscow and given asylum, AP News. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/syria-assad-sweida-daraa-homs-hts-qatar-816e538565d1ae47e016b5765b044d31 (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[10] Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), Operation Olive Branch (2018), Operation Peace Spring (2019)…:
Binley, A. (2023) Turkey strikes Kurdish rebels after Ankara Blast, BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-66979396 (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
Turkish-backed forces launch offensive in a Kurdish-held area of Northern Syria (2024) France 24. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/video/20241209-turkish-backed-forces-launch-offensive-in-northern-syria (Accessed: 09 December 2024).
[11] Hayatsever, B.H. and Butler, D. (2022) Erdogan says Turkey to attack Kurdish militants with tanks, soldiers | reuters, Reuter.com. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/us-urges-de-escalation-syria-after-series-retaliatory-strikes-2022-11-22/ (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[12] Newman, L. and Vinjamuri, L. (2020) Trump withdraws troops from Syria: The fallout | chatham house – international affairs think tank, chathamhouse.org. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/10/trump-withdraws-troops-syria-fallout (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[13] Ottoman empire (no date) Encyclopædia Britannica. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/Ottoman-Empire (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[14] (No date) OPEC : Home. Available at: https://www.opec.org/opec_web (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[15] Hayatsever, H. (2022) Turkey tells Russia it will continue to respond to attacks from northern Syria | reuters, Reuters.com. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-tells-russia-it-will-continue-respond-attacks-northern-syria-2022-11-24/ (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[16] Tanis, F. (2022) Turkey is friendly with both Russia and Ukraine. now it wants them to talk peace, NPR. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2022/11/16/1136473400/turkey-russia-ukraine-peace (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
[17] Hayat Tahrir al-Sham:
Marx, W. (2024) Who are the rebels who have toppled the regime in Syria?, NPR. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2024/12/02/nx-s1-5211873/hts-islamist-syria-aleppo-assad-hayat-tahrir-al-sham (Accessed: 09 December 2024).
[18] Gebeily, M. and Azhari, T. (2024) Syrian rebels topple Assad who flees to Russia in Mideast shakeup, Reuters.com. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-rebels-celebrate-captured-homs-set-sights-damascus-2024-12-07/ (Accessed: 08 December 2024).
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